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Abstract
We estimate a dynamic asset pricing model characterized by heterogeneous boundedly
rational agents. The fundamental value of the risky asset is publicly available to all
agents, but they have di®erent beliefs about the persistence of deviations of stock
prices from the fundamental benchmark. An evolutionary selection mechanism based
on relative past pro¯ts governs the dynamics of the fractions and switching of agents
between di®erent beliefs or forecasting strategies. A strategy attracts more agents
if it performed relatively well in the recent past compared to other strategies. We
estimate the model to annual US stock price data from 1871 until 2003. The estimation
results support the existence of two expectation regimes, and a bootstrap F-test rejects
linearity in favor of our nonlinear two-type heterogeneous agent model. One regime can
be characterized as a fundamentalists regime, because agents believe in mean reversion
of stock prices toward the benchmark fundamental value. The second regime can be
characterized as a chartist, trend following regime because agents expect the deviations
from the fundamental to trend. The fractions of agents using the fundamentalists and
trend following forecasting rules show substantial time variation and switching between
predictors. The model o®ers an explanation for the recent stock prices run-up. Before
the 90s the trend following regime was active only occasionally. However, in the late
90s the trend following regime persisted and created an extraordinary deviation of
stock prices from the fundamentals. Recently, the activation of the mean reversion
regime has contributed to drive stock prices back closer to their fundamental valuation.
Keywords: heterogeneous expectations, stock prices, bubbles, bounded rationality, behavioral
¯nance, evolutionary selection.
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Historical evidence indicates large °uctuations of stock prices compared to indicators of
fundamental value. For example, the price to earnings ratio of the S&P500 was around 5
at the beginning of the 20s, but more than 25 about nine years later to fall back to about
5 again by 1933. In 1995 the price/earnings ratio of the S&P500 was close to 20, went up
to more than 40 at the beginning of 2000 and then quickly declined again to about 20 by
the end of 2003. Why do prices °uctuate so much compared to economic fundamentals?
This question has been strongly debated in ¯nancial economics. At the beginning
of the 80s, Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) claimed that the stock market
exhibits excess volatility, that is, stock price °uctuations are signi¯cantly larger than
movements in underlying economic fundamentals. The debate evolved in two directions.
On the one hand, supporters of rational expectations and market e±ciency proposed
modi¯cations and extensions of the standard theory. In contrast, another part of the
literature focused on providing further empirical evidence against the e±ciency of stock
prices and behavioral models to explain these phenomena. The debate has recently been
revived by the extraordinary surge of stock prices in the late 90s. The internet sector
was the main driving force behind the unprecedented increase in market valuations. Ofek
and Richardson (2002, 2003) estimated that in 1999 the average price-earnings ratio for
internet stocks was more than 600.
A recent overview of rational explanations based on economic fundamentals for the
increase in stock prices in the late 90s is e.g. given by Heaton and Lucas (1999). They
o®er three reasons for the decrease of the equity premium, i.e. the di®erence between
expected returns on the market portfolio of risky stocks and riskless bonds. A ¯rst reason
is the observed increase of households' participation in the stock market. This implies
spreading of equity risk among a larger population, which could explain a decrease of
the risk premium required by investors. Secondly, there is evidence that investors hold
more diversi¯ed portfolios compared to the past. In the 70s a large majority of investors
concentrated their equity holdings on one or two stocks. More recently households have
invested a large proportion of their wealth in mutual funds achieving a much better diver-
si¯cation of risk. Both facts justify a decrease of the required risk premium by investors.
Although the wider participation seems unlikely to play an important role in the surge of
stock prices in the 90s, the increased portfolio diversi¯cation could at least partly account
for the decrease in the equity premium and the unprecedented increase in market valua-
tions. A third, fundamental explanation for the surge of the stock market that has been
1proposed is a shift in corporate practice from paying dividends to repurchasing shares as
an alternative measure to distribute cash to shareholders. In this case dividends do not
measure appropriately the pro¯tability of the asset and such a shift in corporate practice
explains, at least partly, an increase in price-earnings or price-dividend ratios or equiva-
lently a decrease of the risk premium. Further evidence on this issue is provided by Fama
and French (2001).
Some recent papers attempt a quantitative evaluation of the decrease in the equity
premium. Fama and French (2002) argue that, based on average dividend growth, the
real risk premium has signi¯cantly decreased from 4:17% in the period 1872-1950 to 2:5%
after 1950. Jagannathan et al. (2000) go even further and, comparing the equity yield to
a long-term bonds yield, reach the conclusion that the risk premium from 1970 onwards
was approximately 0.7%. That is, investors require almost the same return to invest in
stocks and in 20 years government bonds. The explanations above indicate structural,
fundamental reasons for a long-horizon tendency of the risk premium to decrease, or
equivalently for an increase of the valuation of the aggregate stock market. However, to
quantify the decrease in the equity premium is di±cult and the estimates provided earlier
are questionable. Although fundamental reasons may partly explain an increase of stock
prices, the dramatic movements e.g. in the nineties are hard to interpret as an adjustment
of stock prices toward a new fundamental value.
Another strand of recent literature has provided empirical evidence on market ine±-
ciencies and proposed a behavioral explanation. Hirshleifer (2001) and Barberis and Thaler
(2003) contain extensive surveys of behavioral ¯nance and empirical results both for the
cross-section of returns and for the aggregate stock market. Much attention has been
paid to the continuation of short-term returns and their reversal in the long-run. This
was documented both for the cross-section of returns by de Bondt and Thaler (1985), and
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and for the aggregate market by Cutler et al. (1991). At
short run horizons of 6-12 months, past winners outperform past losers, whereas at longer
horizons of e.g. 3-5 years, past losers outperform past winners. A behavioral explanation
of this phenomenon is that at horizons from 3 months to a year, investors underreact to
news about fundamentals of a company or the economy. They slowly adjust their valua-
tions to incorporate the news and create positive serial correlation in returns. However,
in the adjustment process they drive prices too far from what is warranted by the funda-
mental news. This shows up in returns as negative correlation at longer horizons. Several
behavioral models have been developed to explain the empirical evidence. Barberis et al.
2(1998), henceforth BSV, assume that agents are a®ected by psychological biases in form-
ing expectations about future cash °ows. BSV consider a model with a representative
risk-neutral investor in which the true earnings process is a random walk, but investors
believe that earnings are generated by one of two regimes, a mean-reverting regime and
a trend regime. When confronted with positive fundamental news investors are too con-
servative in extrapolating the appropriate implication for the immediate asset valuation.
However, they overreact to a stream of positive fundamental news because they interpret
it as representative of a new regime of higher growth. The model is able to replicate the
empirical observation of continuation and reversal of stock returns. Another behavioral
model that aims at explaining the same stylized facts is Daniel et al. (1998), henceforth
DHS. Their model stresses the importance of biases in the interpretation of private in-
formation. DHS assume that investors are overcon¯dent and overestimate the precision
of the private signal they receive about the asset pay-o®. The overcon¯dence increases if
the private signal is con¯rmed by public information, but decreases slowly if the private
signal contrasts with public information. The model of BSV assumes that all information
is public and that investors misinterpret fundamental news. In contrast, DHS emphasize
overcon¯dence concerning private information compared to what is warranted by the pub-
lic signal. These models aim to explain the continuation and reversal in the cross-section
of returns. However, as suggested by Barberis and Thaler (2003), both models are also
suitable to explain the aggregate market dynamics.
In this paper we consider an asset pricing model with behavioral heterogeneity and
estimate the model using yearly S&P 500 data from 1871 to 2003. The model is a reformu-
lation, in terms of price-to-cash °ow ratios, of the asset pricing model with heterogeneous
beliefs introduced by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). Agents are boundedly rational
and have heterogeneous beliefs about future pay-o®s of a risky asset. Beliefs about fu-
ture cash °ows are homogeneous and correct, but agents disagree on the speed the asset
price will mean-revert back towards its fundamental value. A key feature of the model
is the endogenous, evolutionary selection of beliefs or expectation rules based upon their
relative past performance, as proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997). The estimation of
our model on yearly S&P 500 data suggests that behavioral heterogeneity is signi¯cant
and that there are two di®erent regimes, a \mean reversion" regime and a \trend fol-
lowing" regime. To each regime, there corresponds a di®erent (class of) investor types:
fundamentalists and trend followers. These two investor types co-exist and their fractions
show considerable °uctuations over time. The mean-reversion regime corresponds to the
3situation when the market is dominated by fundamentalists, who recognize a mispricing
of the asset and expect the stock price to move back towards its fundamental value. The
other trend following regime represents a situation when the market is dominated by trend
followers, expecting continuation of say good news in the (near) future and expect positive
stock returns. Before the 90s, the trend regime is activated only occasionally and never
persisted for more than two consecutive years. However, in the late 90s the fraction of
investors believing in a trend increased close to one and persisted for a number of years.
The prediction of an explosive growth of the stock market by trend followers was con¯rmed
by annual returns of more than 20% for four consecutive years. These high realized yearly
returns convinced many investors to also adopt the trend following belief thus reenforcing
an unprecedented deviation of stock prices from their fundamental value.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some closely related literature.
Section 3 describes the asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs and endogenous
switching, while Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 discusses empirical
implications of our model, in particular the impulse response to a permanent positive
shock to the fundamental and a simulation based prediction of how likely or unlikely high
valuation ratios are in the future. Finally, Section 6 concludes and an appendix contains
the details of a bootstrap F-test for linearity and discusses the robustness of our estimation
with respect to time-variation in the fundamental value.
2 Related Literature
Our model is closely related to other work in behavioral ¯nance, and it is useful to discuss
some similarities and di®erences with models recently proposed in this literature. We also
refer the reader to the extensive surveys on behavioral ¯nance by Barberis and Thaler
(2003) and Hirshleifer (2001) and the recent survey on dynamic heterogeneous agent mod-
els in economics and ¯nance in Hommes (2006). Behavioral heterogeneity di®erentiates
our model from Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998) who both assume a rep-
resentative agent. In contrast, we allow for the coexistence of di®erent types of investors
with heterogeneous expectations about future payo®s and evolutionary switching between
di®erent investment strategies. Disagreement in asset pricing models can arise because
of two assumptions: di®erential information and di®erential interpretation. In the ¯rst
case, there is an information asymmetry between one group of agents that observes a pri-
vate signal and the rest of the population that has to learn the fundamental value from
public information such as prices. Asymmetric information causes heterogeneous expec-
4tations among agents. Recent models of this type are Grundy and Kim (2002) and Biais
et al. (2003). The second assumption is based on the fact that a public signal can be
interpreted in di®erent ways by investors. Agents use di®erent `models of the market' to
update their subjective valuation based on the earnings news and this might lead them
to hold di®erent beliefs. Empirical evidence to support this hypothesis has been provided
by Kandel and Pearson (1995). They analyze the revisions of analysts earnings forecasts
around announcements. They provide signi¯cant evidence for the hypothesis that beliefs
among ¯nancial analysts are indeed heterogeneous. These ¯ndings are able to explain
the abnormal volume of trade around earnings announcements even when prices do not
change. However, the heterogeneity of expectations might play a signi¯cant role in asset
pricing. A large number of models have been proposed that incorporate this hypothesis.
A few relevant references are Harris and Raviv (1993) and Hong and Stein (1999). Some
papers have also suggested that the combination of di®erences in beliefs and short-sales
constraints can explain persistent deviations of stock prices from intrinsic valuations. In
the presence of short-sales constraints, investors that are pessimistic about a stock will
not be able to short the stock and they will simply not hold it. However, optimistic agents
will buy the stock and the market price will be such that it re°ects only the optimistic
valuations in the population. This hypothesis was introduced by Miller (1977) and is
recently reconsidered by Chen et al. (2002) and Hong and Stein (2003). The empirical
implications for the cross-section of stock returns is investigated by Diether et al. (2002).
In our model we assume that the fundamental value of the asset is common knowledge.
However, investors have heterogeneous beliefs about the speed of reversion of stock prices
towards the intrinsic valuation. They expect that a mispricing will adjust at di®erent
horizons. For example, assume the market is currently overvalued. In our setup, this
is common knowledge but one group of agents, the fundamentalists, is pessimistic and
believes that this situation will soon be corrected. However, the rest of the population, the
trend followers, is optimistic and believes that in the short run the price trend will continue.
Our model allows for the coexistence of groups with di®erent sentiment about the evolution
of the stock market. This assumption is supported by the survey evidence in Shiller (2000),
Fisher and Statman (2002) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003). These surveys involve both
institutional and individual investors from di®erent sources during the 90s. A common
result emerges from them. During the surge in stock prices of the 90s, a large fraction
of investors were aware of the overvaluation but they continued to buy stocks because
they expected the mispricing to be corrected only at longer-horizons. Vissing-Jorgensen
5(2003) reports that at the beginning of 2000, 50% of individual investors considered the
stock market to be overvalued, approximately 25% believed that it was fairly valued and
less than 10% that it was undervalued. This is a clear indication that opinions among
individual investors were heterogeneous and that they had di®erent beliefs about the
prospect of the stock market. Similar survey evidence for exchange rate expectations
has been found by Frankel and Froot (1987,1990). Their survey data analysis shows that
¯nancial experts extrapolate past trends in exchange rates at short horizons from 1 week up
to 3 months, whereas the same experts have mean reverting expectations at longer horizons
of 6-12 months. They also provide evidence that from the end of the seventies until the
mid eighties the relative proportion among forecasting services of trend-following beliefs
compared to fundamental mean reverting rules, increased. They argue that the relative
popularity of technical trading rules compared to fundamental rules may have ampli¯ed
the strong rise of the dollar exchange rate in the early eighties and its subsequent fall after
February 1985. Shiller (2000) ¯nds similar evidence that the sentiment of investors varies
signi¯cantly over time. Both for institutional and individual investors there is evidence
that they become more optimistic (or more bullish) in response to signi¯cant increases
in the recent performance of the stock market. This evidence supports one of the key
assumption of our model: evolutionary switching between di®erent beliefs or investment
strategies. We assume that agents adopt a belief based on its past performance relative
to the competing strategies. If a belief performs relatively well, as measured by realized
pro¯ts, it attracts more investors. Instead, the fraction of the agents using the \losing"
strategies will decrease. Realized returns thus contribute to give more support to some of
the beliefs strategies rather than others and lead to time variation in the sentiment of the
market. The assumption of evolutionary switching among beliefs adds a dynamical aspect
that is missing in most of the models with heterogeneous opinions mentioned above. In
our model investors are boundedly rational because they learn from the past performance
of the strategies which one is more likely to be successful in the near future. They do not
use in every period the same predictor and make mistakes, but switch between beliefs in
order to minimize their errors. Our model is also consistent with asset market laboratory
experiments such as Smith et al. (1988), who found bubbles and crashes in their asset
market experiments. Recent asset pricing laboratory experiments in Hommes et al. (2005)
show that agents may coordinate expectations on trend following behavior and mean
reversion, leading to asset price °uctuations around a constant fundamental price.
Our paper is also related to earlier work on assessing the contributions of market fun-
6damentals and rational bubbles to stock-price °uctuations, for example in Blanchard and
Watson (1982), Flood and Hodrick (1990), West (1987) and Diba and Grossman (1988).
In our behavioral model agents are not fully rational, but at least boundedly rational in
the sense that they are driven by short run pro¯tability. In particular, the model of Evans
(1991) of periodically collapsing rational bubbles is somewhat similar in spirit. In this
model asset prices grow at a rate larger than the risk free rate for some time, but have
an exogenously given positive probability of collapsing in each period. In our behavioral
model asset prices also exhibit di®erent phases of larger growth than the discount rate,
when trend followers dominate the market, and mean reversion when fundamentalists dom-
inate, with the probability of switching between the two phases determined endogenously
by recent realized pro¯ts.
Our paper may be seen as one of the ¯rst attempts to estimate a behavioral model with
heterogeneous agents on stock market data. Only few attempts have been made to estimate
a heterogeneous agent model (HAM). An early example is Shiller (1984), who presents
a heterogeneous agent model with smart money traders, having rational expectations,
versus ordinary investors (whose behavior is in fact not modeled at all). Shiller estimates
the fraction of smart money investors over the period 1900-1983, and ¯nds considerable
°uctuations of the fraction over a range between 0 and 50%. More recently, Baak (1999)
and Chavas (2000) estimate HAMs on hog and beef market data, and found evidence for
the heterogeneity of expectations. For the beef market Chavas (2000) ¯nds that about
47% of the beef producers behave naively (using only the last price in their forecast),
18% of the beef producers behaves rationally, whereas 35% behaves quasi-rationally (i.e.
use a univariate autoregressive time series model of prices in forecasting). Winker and
Gilli (2001) and Gilli and Winker (2003) estimate the exchange rate model of Kirman
(1991, 1993) with fundamentalists and chartists, using the daily DM-US$ exchange rates
1991-2000. Their estimated parameter values correspond to a bimodal distribution of
agents, and Gilli and Winker (2003) conclude that the foreign exchange market can be
better characterized by switching moods of the investors than by assuming that the mix
of fundamentalists and chartists remains stable over time. Westerho® and Reitz (2003)
also estimate an HAM with fundamentalists and chartists to exchange rates and ¯nd
considerable °uctuations of the market impact of fundamentalists. Another recent example
is Alfarano et al. (2005) who estimate a simple agent-based ¯nancial market model with
herding using returns from gold prices, stock prices of two large German companies and
the DAX stock market index. Another empirical application of a HAM with switching
7between fundamentalists and chartists is de Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), who explain
the main stylized facts of exchange rates. All these papers suggest that heterogeneity
is important in explaining the data, but much more work is needed to investigate the
robustness of this empirical ¯nding. Our paper may be seen as one of the ¯rst attempts
to estimate a behavioral HAM on stock market data and investigate whether behavioral
heterogeneity is signi¯cant.
3 The Model
We consider the asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs introduced by Brock and
Hommes (1997, 1998) and reformulate the model in terms of price to cash °ow in order to
estimate the model on yearly S&P 500 data. There are two assets available, a risky and a
riskless asset. The riskless asset is in perfectly elastic supply and pays a constant return
r. The risky asset is in zero net supply and pays an uncertain cash °ow Yt in each period.
The price of the risky asset in period t is denoted by Pt. The excess return of the risky
asset is de¯ned as
Rt+1 = Pt+1 + Yt+1 ¡ (1 + r)Pt: (1)
We assume that investors have heterogeneous beliefs about future payo®s. In particular, we
assume that agents choose among H types of beliefs or forecasting rules. The expectation
of investors type h about the conditional mean and variance of the excess return are
Eh;t[Rt+1] and Vh;t[Rt+1], for h = 1;:::;H. We assume that type h agents have a myopic





For analytical tractability, following Brock and Hommes (1998), we assume that all in-
vestors have the same risk aversion parameter, ah = a, and that they have homogeneous
expectations about the conditional variance, Vh;t[Rt+1] ´ Vt[Rt+1]. The only source of
heterogeneity that we allow in the model concerns the beliefs about the future payo®s of
the risky asset. We denote the fraction of investors in the economy using predictor h at





Eh;t[Pt+1 + Yt+1] ¡ (1 + r)Pt
aVt[Rt+1]
= 0; (3)






nh;tEh;t(Pt+1 + Yt+1): (4)
According to (4) the price at time t of the risky asset is given by the discounted, weighted
average (by the fractions) of investors' beliefs about next period pay-o®s. Notice that the





Eh;t[Pt+1 + Yt+1 ¡ Pt]
Pt
; (5)
that is, in equilibrium the average required rate of return for investors to hold the risky
asset equals the discount rate r. In the estimation of the model in Section 4 the discount
rate r will be set equal to the sum of the (risk free) interest rate and the required risk
premium on stocks1. From (4) it is clear that the equilibrium price will be high if an
optimistic type dominates the market, that is, when the fraction of investors expecting
a high next period payo® is large. On the other hand, pessimistic beliefs about future
payo®s will drive the equilibrium price to lower levels. We assume that investors have
homogeneous expectations about the cash °ow. In contrast to Brock and Hommes (1998),
who assume an IID process for the cash °ow, we consider a non-stationary cash °ow with
a constant growth rate. More precisely, we assume that logYt is a Gaussian random walk
with drift, that is,









À = (1 + g)"t+1; (7)
where g = e¹+ 1
2¾2
À ¡ 1 and "t+1 = eÀt+1+ 1
2¾2
À, which implies Et("t+1) = 1. We assume that
all types have correct beliefs on the cash °ow, that is,
Eh;t[Yt+1] = Et[Yt+1] = (1 + g)YtEt["t+1] = (1 + g)Yt: (8)
Since the cash °ow is an exogenously given stochastic process it seems natural to assume
that agents have learned the correct beliefs on next periods cash °ow Yt+1. In particular,
1Alternatively, the model can be extended to allow for a nonzero risk premium by introducing a positive
net supply of the risky asset. This is not considered here for analytical tractability.
9boundedly rational agents can learn about the constant growth rate e.g. by running
a simple regression of log(Yt=Yt¡1) on a constant. In contrast, prices are determined
endogenously and in particular prices are a®ected by expectations about next period's
price. In a heterogeneous world, agreement about next period's price therefore seems more
unlikely than agreement about the cash °ow, and therefore we will assume heterogeneous
beliefs about next period's price as discussed below. The pricing equation (4) can be


























= (1 + g)Eh;t[±t+1]: (10)
In the special case, when all agents have rational expectations the equilibrium pricing




Et(Pt+1 + Yt+1): (11)
It is well known that, in the case of a constant growth rate g for dividends, the rational
expectations fundamental price, P¤





Yt; r > g; (12)










We will refer to P¤
t as the fundamental price and to ±¤
t as the fundamental PY-ratio.




R¤ f1 + Et[±t+1]g: (14)
In terms of the deviation from the fundamental ratio, xt = ±t ¡±¤














We now specify how agents form their beliefs about next period's PY-ratio. We assume
that the fundamental PY-ratio is known to all investors. However, agents have di®erent
beliefs about the persistence of the deviation from the fundamental. The expectation of
belief type h about next period PY-ratio is expressed as
Eh;t[±t+1] = Et[±¤
t+1] + fh(xt¡1;:::;xt¡L) = m + fh(xt¡1;:::;xt¡L); (17)
where ±¤
t represents the fundamental PY-ratio, Et(±¤
t+1) = m is the rational expectation of
the PY-ratio available to all agents, xt is the deviation of the PY-ratio from its fundamental
value and fh(¢) represents the expected transitory deviation of the PY-ratio from the
fundamental value, depending on L past deviations. The information available to investors
at time t includes present and past cash °ows and past prices. In other words, we do not
allow agents to react to the contemporaneous equilibrium price but only to past realized
prices. This assumption about the information set available to traders was previously used
by Hellwig (1982) and Blume et al. (1994) in a rational expectations setup. Another way
of interpreting this assumption is that investors can only trade using market orders. A
similar assumption is also used by Hong and Stein (1999). At the beginning of the period
agents choose their optimal demand of the risky asset determined by past realized prices
and at the end of period t, the market clearing price Pt is determined. We can reformulate
Equation (17) in terms of deviations from the fundamental PY-ratio, xt, as
Eh;t[xt+1] = fh(xt¡1;:::;xt¡L): (18)
The function f(¢) can be interpreted as the belief of investors type h about the evolution
of the transitory component in the asset price. Note that the rational expectations, fun-
damental benchmark is nested in our heterogeneous agent model as a special case when
fh ´ 0 for all types h. In Section 4 we will estimate the model to investigate whether






From this equilibrium equation it is clear that the adjustment towards the fundamental
PY-ratio will be slow if a majority of investors has persistent beliefs about it.
Evolutionary selection of expectations
In addition to the evidence of persistent deviations from the fundamentals there is also
signi¯cant evidence of time variation in the sentiment of investors. This has been docu-
mented, for example, by Shiller (2000) using survey data. In the model considered here,
agents are boundedly rational and switch between di®erent forecasting strategies accord-
ing to relative recently realized pro¯ts. At the beginning of period t the realized pro¯ts
for each of the strategies are publicly available. We denote by ¼h;t¡1 the realized pro¯ts
of type h at the end of period t ¡ 1, given by




where Rt¡1 = Pt¡1+Yt¡1¡(1+r)Pt¡2 is the realized excess return, as given in (1), at time
t ¡ 1 and zh;t¡2 indicates the demand of the risky asset by belief type h, as given in (2),
formed in period t ¡ 2. In other words, ¼h;t¡1 represents the excess pro¯t realized in the
previous period by strategy h, in terms of quantities observed at the beginning of period t.
In order to have a convenient expression of the excess pro¯t in terms of the PY-ratio, we
make two more simplifying assumptions. The ¯rst assumption is to approximate realized
excess return in (20) by
Rt¡1 = Pt¡1 + Yt¡1 ¡ (1 + r)Pt¡2 = (±t¡1 + 1)Yt¡1 ¡ (1 + r)Pt¡2
¼ (±t¡1 + 1)(1 + g)Yt¡2 ¡ (1 + r)Pt¡2
= (±t¡1 + 1 ¡ R¤±t¡2)(1 + g)Yt¡2; (21)
where R¤ = (1+r)=(1+g) as before. The approximation involves replacing the stochastic
dividend/earnings part Yt¡1 of realized excess return by average or expected cash °ow
(1 + g)Yt¡2. Under this assumption, the ¯tness measure is not a®ected by the stochastic
growth rate of the dividend, but rather depends on the average growth rate g. Brock
and Hommes (1998) refer to the model where stochastic dividend is replaced by expected
12dividend as the nonlinear deterministic skeleton model. The implied expected return is
Eh;t¡2[Rt¡1] = (Eh;t¡2[±t¡1] + 1 ¡ R¤±t¡2)(1 + g)Yt¡2: (22)
A second simplifying assumption concerns the beliefs about the conditional variance of
excess returns. Recall that we already assumed these beliefs to be the same for all types.
In the special case of an IID cash °ow Yt, Brock and Hommes (1998) made the assumption
that the beliefs about the conditional variance of excess returns are the same and constant
for all types, i.e. Vh;t¡2[Rt¡1] = Vt¡2[Rt¡1] = ¾2. Note that this is equivalent to assuming
that all types have fundamentalists' beliefs about conditional variance. We follow the
same approach here in the case of a cash °ow Yt with constant growth rate, so that for all
types the beliefs about conditional variance is given by
Vh;t¡2[Rt¡1] = Vh;t¡2[Pt¡1 + Yt¡1 ¡ (1 + r)Pt¡2] = Vt¡2[P¤
t¡1 + Yt¡1 ¡ (1 + r)P¤
t¡2]
= Vt¡2[(m + 1)Yt¡1 ¡ (1 + r)mYt¡2] = Vt¡2[(m + 1)(1 + g)Yt¡2²t¡1] = Y 2
t¡2´2;
(23)
where ´2 = (1+m)2(1+g)2Vt¡2[²t¡1]. Combining (20) with (21){(23), the ¯tness measure




= (±t¡1 + 1 ¡ R¤±t¡2)(1 + g)Yt¡2





a´2 (±t¡1 + 1 ¡ R¤±t¡2)(Eh;t¡2[±t¡1] + 1 ¡ R¤±t¡2): (24)
Using the deviation xt = ±t ¡ m of the PY ratio from its fundamental value, with m =
(1 + g)=(r ¡ g), we can further rewrite Equation (24) as
¼h;t¡1 =
(1 + g)2
a´2 (xt¡1 ¡ R¤xt¡2)(Eh;t¡2[xt¡1] ¡ R¤xt¡2): (25)
This ¯tness measure has a simple, intuitive explanation in terms of forecasting performance
for next period's deviation from the fundamental. A positive demand zh;t¡2 may be seen
as a bet that xt¡1 would go up more than what was expected on average from R¤xt¡2.
The realized ¯tness ¼h;t¡1 of strategy h is the realized pro¯t from that bet and it will be
positive if both the realized deviation xt¡1 > R¤xt¡2 and the forecast of the deviation
Eh;t¡2[xt¡1] > R¤xt¡2. More generally, if both the realized absolute deviation jxt¡1j and
the absolute predicted deviation jEh;t¡2[xt¡1]j to the fundamental value are larger than
13R¤ times the absolute deviation jxt¡2j, then strategy h generates positive realized ¯tness.
In contrast, a strategy that wrongly predicts whether the asset price mean reverts back
towards the fundamental value or moves away from the fundamental generates a negative
realized ¯tness.
At the beginning of period t investors compare the realized relative performances of
the di®erent strategies and withdraw capital from those that performed poorly and move
it to better strategies. The model assumes that the fractions nh;t evolve according to a













where the parameter ¯ > 0 is called the intensity of choice and ¢¼
h;k
t¡1 = ¼h;t¡1 ¡ ¼k;t¡1
denotes the di®erence in realized pro¯ts of belief type h compared to type k. Brock and
Hommes (1997, 1998) proposed this model for endogenous selection of expectations rules.
Anderson et al. (1993) contains an extensive discussion and many other economic appli-
cations of the multinomial logit model for describing the choice probabilities of boundedly
rational agents among ¯nitely many alternatives. The key feature of Equation (26) is that
strategies with higher ¯tness (realized pro¯ts) in the recent past attract more followers.
Stated di®erently, the evolutionary mechanism in (26) captures the performance based
selection of the winning beliefs in the recent past. Agents are boundedly rational in the
sense that they abandon beliefs that performed poorly in the recent past. Hence, they
do not systematically make mistakes but learn about the most pro¯table predictor in the
recent past. The intensity of choice parameter ¯ regulates the speed of transition between
di®erent beliefs. A high value of ¯ represents a situation in which agents react quickly to
the most recent performances of the strategies. In this case they switch rapidly to last
period's best performing belief. In contrast, a small value of ¯ corresponds to the case
where agents are reluctant to switch to other beliefs unless they observe large performance
di®erentials between the strategies.
A simple two-type example
Brock and Hommes (1998) studied the deterministic skeleton of the dynamic asset pric-
ing model of Equations (19), (20) and (26) with various heterogeneous belief types, such
as fundamentalists versus trend followers. They showed that the nonlinear evolutionary
model may lead to multiple steady states, limit cycles and even chaotic asset price °uctu-
14ations around an unstable fundamental price. In the present application, we assume that
the economy is characterized by two types of traders, that is H = 2. We assume that both
predict next period's deviation by extrapolating past realizations in a linear fashion, that
is
Eh;t[xt+1] = fh(xt¡1) = Áhxt¡1: (27)
In the estimation of the model in the next section, it turns out that higher order lags are
not signi¯cant, so we focus on the simplest case with only one lag in the function fh(¢),
with Áh the parameter characterizing the strategy of type h. The dynamic asset pricing
model can then be written as
R¤xt = ntÁ1xt¡1 + (1 ¡ nt)Á2xt¡1 + ²t; (28)
where Á1 and Á2 denote the coe±cients of the two types of beliefs, nt represents the
fraction of investors that belong to the ¯rst type of traders and ²t represents a disturbance
term. The value of the parameter Áh can be interpreted as follows. If it is positive and
smaller than 1 it suggests that investors expect the stock price to mean revert towards the
fundamental value. We will refer to this type of agents as fundamentalists, because they
expect the asset price to move back towards its fundamental value. The closer Áh is to 1
the more persistent are the expected deviations. If the beliefs parameter Áh is larger than
1, it implies that investors believe the deviation of the stock prices to grow over time at a
constant speed. We will refer to this type of agents as trend followers. Note in particular
that when one group of investors believes in a strong trend, i.e. Áh > R¤, this may cause
asset prices to deviate further from their fundamental value.




1 + expf¡¯¤ [(Á1 ¡ Á2)xt¡3(xt¡1 ¡ R¤xt¡2)]g
(29)
where ¯¤ = ¯(1 + g)2=(a´2). The fraction depends on the di®erence in extrapolation
rates of the 2 groups, the deviation from the fundamentals and the last period change in
deviations. Notice that in periods when the deviation is approximately constant, that is,
xt¡1 ¼ xt¡2 ¼ xt¡3 ¼ ¹ x, the fraction depends on the squared value of the deviation. If
Á1 < Á2, the fraction is close to 0.5 for small deviations while it tends to 1 for large ¹ x. This
suggests that when the ¯rst group has less persistent beliefs compared to the other group
and deviations become large, their fraction increases towards 1. Hence, there is evidence
that the more stabilizing expectations become active when they are most needed, that is,
15when the asset price is far away from the fundamentals.
4 Estimation Results
In this section we estimate the two-type model in equations (28) and (29). We use an up-
dated version of the data set described in Shiller (1989), consisting of annual observations
of the S&P500 index from 1871 to 2003. We estimate the model with both dividends and
earnings as cash °ows. The valuation ratios are then the Price-to-Dividends (PD) and the
Price-to-Earnings (PE) ratios.
A convenient feature of the model is that it has been formulated in deviations from
a benchmark fundamental. After a choice for the fundamental price has been made, the
model can be estimated. As discussed already in the previous section, we de¯ne the asset
fundamental value using the static Gordon growth model (Gordon (1962)), that is, the
Present Value Model (PVM) with constant discount rate r and constant growth rate g of
the cash °ow Yt, for which
P¤





t indicates the fundamental price of the asset. Under the assumptions of the
static Gordon model the fundamental value of the asset is a multiple m of its cash °ow
where m depends on the discount rate r and the cash °ow growth rate g. The multiple m
can also be interpreted as the PD and PE ratios implied by the PVM model. In order to
check the robustness of our estimation results, in Appendix B we also consider a dynamic
version of the Gordon model proposed by Poterba and Summers (1988). In this case, we
relax the assumption of a constant cash °ow growth rate and allow for time variation in
the fundamental value.





where g is the constant growth rate of the cash °ow as before and the discount rate r is the
risk free interest rate plus a risk premium. We use an estimate of the risk premium {the
di®erence between the expected return on the market portfolio of common stocks and the
risk-free interest rate{ to obtain R¤. Recently, Fama and French (2002) used the Gordon
constant growth valuation model to measure the magnitude of the equity premium on
16the same dataset used in this paper. The return on stocks may be written as the rate of
capital gain plus the cash-°ow-yield Yt=Pt¡1, i.e.









Under the Gordon model with constant growth rate g of the cash °ow, the rate of capital
gain equals the growth rate of the cash °ow. As in Fama and French (2002) we thus
estimate the risk premium RP by
RP = g + y=p ¡ i; (33)
where y=p denotes the average dividend yield Yt=Pt¡1 and i is the risk free interest rate.
For annual data from 1871 to 2003 of the S&P500 index the results are summarized in
Table 12.
Table 1 about here
Using dividends as a measure of cash °ow, Fama and French (2002) found that the
estimated equity premium has signi¯cantly decreased after 1951. We follow the same
practice and ¯nd an estimate of the risk premium of 4.84% in the period 1871-1950 and
an estimate of 2.16% for 1951-2003. Our results slightly di®er from theirs due to the longer
sample that we consider. Fama and French (2002) do not ¯nd evidence of predictability
of the dividend growth rate thus supporting the hypothesis that it does not vary over
time. The last column of Table (1) reports the corresponding average price-dividend
ratios. Before 1951 the PD-ratio is 18:6 and after 1951 it increases to 29:6, as illustrated
in Figure 1 which also plots the corresponding fundamental value P¤
t = mYt. In the
Introduction we outlined some of the explanations based on economic fundamentals for
the decrease in the estimated equity premium. One possible explanation is the steady
decline in the number of companies that pay-out dividends, as documented in Fama and
French (2001). Such changes in dividend policies and share repurchases from companies
might create transitory shifts in the mean of the PD ratio although the mean reversion
pattern should not be a®ected.
We also use earnings as a measure of cash °ow to check the robustness of our results.
Fama and French (2002) use the earnings data only for the period 1951 until 2000 because
of concerns about the quality of the data before 1950. When earnings are used to determine
2Our estimates are slightly di®erent from Fama and French (2002), because as in Shiller (1989), we use
the CPI index to de°ate nominal values.
17the fundamental valuation we follow the practice of Campbell and Shiller (2001) and
smooth earnings by a 10 years moving average. We do not ¯nd evidence of a signi¯cant
change pre/post 1950 for the equity premium when earnings are considered. The estimated
equity premium on the full sample is equal to 6.56%. The corresponding average price-
earnings ratio is 13:4, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 suggests that there is a clear long-term co-movement of the stock price and
the fundamental value. However, the PD and PE ratios take persistent swings away
from the value predicted by the PVM model. This suggests that the fundamental value
does not account completely for the dynamics of stock prices, as was suggested in the
early debate on mean reversion by Summers (1986). A survey of the on-going debate is
given in Campbell and Shiller (2001). Here we use the simple constant growth Gordon
model for the fundamental price and estimate our two type model on deviations from this
benchmark.
Figure 1 about here
Using yearly data of the S&P 500 index from 1871 to 2003, we estimate the parameters
(Á0
1;Á0
2;¯¤) in model (28) and (29) by NonLinear Least Squares (NLLS). Here, (Á0
1, Á0
2) are
parameter vectors of the linear forecasting rules of the two types, but for both types only
the ¯rst lag turns out to be signi¯cant. Table (1) reports that the corresponding values
of R¤ = (1+r)=(1+g) are 1:074 for the PE ratio, 1:055 for the PD ratio before 1950 and
1:034 after 1951. We report the R2 of the regression, the value of the Akaike selection
criterion (AIC), and the AIC for a linear AR(1) model, the estimated coe±cient of the
AR(1) model, the p-value of the Ljung-Box test, QLB, for residuals autocorrelation of 4th
order and the test statistic and p-value of the bootstrap F-test for linearity described in
Appendix A. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
PD ratio: 1871-2003 The partial autocorrelation function (PACF) of the time series
suggests only positive autocorrelation up to the ¯rst lag. This is also con¯rmed by the
estimation results for the model with one lag in the forecasting rules which do not show
signs of misspeci¯cation of the model. The estimation results are as follows:
R¤xt = ntf0:762xt¡1g + (1 ¡ nt)f1:135xt¡1g + b ²t
(0:056) (0:036)
(34)
nt = f1 + exp[¡10:29(¡0:373xt¡3)(xt¡1 ¡ R¤xt¡2)]g¡1
(6:94)
18R2=0:82; AIC=3:17; AICAR(1)=3:31; ÁAR(1)=0:968; QLB(4)=0:44; Fboot(p-value)=22:04 (0:00)
The belief coe±cients are strongly signi¯cant and di®erent from each other. On the other
hand, the intensity of choice ¯¤ is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. We emphasize
however, that it is a common result in switching-type regression models that the parame-
ter ¯¤ in the transition function is hardly signi¯cant and has a large standard deviation,
because large changes in ¯¤ cause only small variation of the fraction nt. As suggested by
TerÄ asvirta (1994), this should not be worrying as long as there is signi¯cant heterogeneity
in the estimated regimes. The nonlinear switching model achieves a lower value for the
AIC selection criterion compared to a linear AR(1) model. This suggests that the model
is capturing nonlinearity in the data. This is also con¯rmed by the bootstrap F-test for
linearity that strongly rejects the null hypothesis of linearity in favor of the heteroge-
neous agent model. The residuals of the regression do not show signi¯cant evidence of
autocorrelation at the 5% signi¯cance level.
The estimated coe±cient of the ¯rst regime is 0.76, corresponding to an half-life of
about two and a half years. The ¯rst regime can be characterized as fundamentalist
beliefs, expecting the asset price to move back towards its fundamental value. In contrast,
the second regime has an estimated coe±cient equal to 1.13, implying that in this regime
agents are trend followers, believing the deviation of the stock price to grow over time
at a constant speed larger than R¤. When the fraction of investors using this belief is
equal or close to 1 we have an explosive behavior in the PD ratio. We can represent
the sentiment of investors as switching between a stable fundamentalists regime and a
trend following regime. In normal periods agents consider the deviation as a temporary
phenomenon and expect it to revert back to fundamentals quickly. In other periods, a
rapid increase of stock prices not paralleled by improvements in the fundamentals causes
losses for fundamentalists and pro¯ts for trend followers. Evolutionary pressure will then
cause more fundamentalists to become trend followers, thus reenforcing the trend in prices.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 shows the time series of the fraction of fundamentalists, a scatter plot of the
fraction of fundamentalists against the di®erence in pro¯ts of the two strategies and the
time series of the average market sentiment at date t, de¯ned as
Át =
ntÁ1 + (1 ¡ nt)Á2
R¤ : (35)
19It is clear that the fraction of fundamentalists varies considerably over time with periods in
which it is close to 0.5 and other periods in which it is close to either of the extremes 0 or
1. The series of the average market sentiment shows that there is signi¯cant time variation
between periods of strong mean reversion when the market is dominated by fundamentalist
and other periods in which Át is close to or exceeds 1 and the market is dominated by
trend followers. These plots also o®er an explanation of the events of the late 90s: for four
consecutive years the trend following strategy outperformed the fundamentalists strategy
and a majority of agents switched to the trend following strategy, driving the average
market sentiment beyond 1 thus reenforcing the strong price trend. However, at the turn
of the market in 2000 the fraction of fundamentalists increased again, approaching 1 thus
contributing to the reversal toward the fundamental value in subsequent years.
PE ratio: 1881-2003 Also for the deviations from the PE ratio the best model spec-
i¯cation includes only one lag for the forecasting rules. The estimation results are as
follows:
R¤xt = ntf0:80 xt¡1g + (1 ¡ nt)f1:097xt¡1g + b ²t
(0:074) (0:052)
(36)
nt = f1 + exp[¡7:54 (¡0:29xt¡3)(xt¡1 ¡ R¤xt¡2)]g¡1
(4:93)
R2=0:77; AIC=2:23; AICAR(1)=2:29; ÁAR(1)=0:983; QLB(4)=0:94; Fboot(p-value)=10:15 (0:011)
The belief parameters are strongly signi¯cant but the intensity of choice, ¯¤, is not sig-
ni¯cantly di®erent from zero. As before, the estimation results show that there are two
signi¯cantly di®erent regimes: one characterized by a coe±cient 0.80 and the other by a
coe±cient equal to 1.097. The estimated parameters are close to the estimated values for
the PD ratio. The qualitative interpretation of the regimes is the same as before: one
group of fundamentalists believing that the stock price will mean revert towards the fun-
damental value and another group of trend followers believing that prices will persistently
deviate from the fundamental valuation.
Figure 3 about here
Figure 3 shows the time series plot of the fraction of fundamentalists. The pattern of
the °uctuations in the fraction, between the extremes 0 and 1 is similar to the PD ratio.
In particular, the dynamics of fractions during the late 90s is similar for both the PD
20and PE ratio: in 1995 the fraction of fundamentalists was close to zero and almost all
agents extrapolated aggressively using the trend following belief; this situation persisted
until 2000 when the stock market turned direction and the fraction of fundamentalists
jumped close to 1 and almost all agents believed that it was time for stock prices to revert
back towards the fundamental values. The fraction of fundamentalists remained close to
1 in the following years absorbing quickly the deviation from the fundamentals. Also the
average market sentiment suggests a similar interpretation: historically there have been
years in which the market was dominated by trend followers. In particular, in the late 90s
the average market sentiment Át was larger than 1 for a number of years, driving stock
prices further away from their fundamental valuation.
The estimation results suggest that we identify two di®erent belief strategies: one in
which agents expect continuation of returns and the other in which they expect reversal.
We also ¯nd that there are some years in which one type of expectations dominates the
market. Our results indicate that in most periods the population of investors is divided in
groups adopting di®erent strategies. The persistence of the continuation regime is clearly
in°uenced by the annual frequency of the data that we are using. Probably, using quarterly
or monthly observations would indicate more persistence in the trend regime. However, it
is clear that the expectation of continuation of positive returns dominated the market in
the late 90s. Both for the PD and PE ratios the market sentiment coe±cient Át (de¯ned in
Equation (35)) is larger than 1 in the late 90s. Despite the awareness of the mispricing, in
this period investors were aggressively extrapolating the continuation of the extraordinary
performances realized in the past years. Our empirical ¯ndings support the assumptions
of BSV. Although there are marked di®erences with our model, they provide a similar
explanation for the mechanism of continuation and reversal. Investors switch between
expecting earnings to follow a trend or a mean reverting process. This implies that prices
will also have a trend or revert back to the true (random walk) fundamentals. However,
BSV assume that at each period the entire population either believes in continuation or
reversal. Instead, our model accounts for the fact that the average market sentiment
results from a group of investors expecting continuation and another group expecting
mean reversion toward the fundamental. Another advantage of our approach is that
we endogenize the switching of agents among beliefs. The evolutionary mechanism that
relates predictor choice to their past performance is supported by the data. It con¯rms
also previous evidence that pointed in this direction. Based on answers to a survey, Shiller
(2000) constructed indices of \Bubble Expectations" and of \Investor Con¯dence". In
21both cases, he ¯nds that the time variation in the indices is well explained by the lagged
change in stock prices. Based on a di®erent survey, Fisher and Statman (2002) ¯nd that in
the late 90s individual investors had expectations of continuation of recent stock returns
while institutional investors were expecting reversals. This is an interesting approach to
identify heterogeneity of beliefs based on the type of investors rather than the type of
beliefs.
5 Empirical Implications
In this section we discuss empirical implications of the estimation of our nonlinear evo-
lutionary switching model with heterogeneous beliefs. First, we investigate the response
to a positive shock to fundamentals when the asset is overvalued. Secondly, we address
the question concerning the probability that a bubble may resume by considering the evo-
lution of the valuation ratios conditional on being at the end of 2003. These simulation
experiments are related and both show the importance of considering nonlinear e®ects in
the dynamics of stock prices.
5.1 Response to a Fundamental Shock
We use the estimated parameters to investigate the response of the market valuation
to good news. Assume that at the beginning of period t the cash °ow increases due
to a permanent increase in the growth rate. This implies that the asset has a higher
fundamental valuation ratio, but what is the e®ect on the market valuation? We address
this question both for the linear and the nonlinear switching model. The linear model
may be interpreted as a representative agent model believing in an average mean reversion
towards the fundamental. We only consider the estimated parameter values for the PD-
ratio; the results for the PE-ratio are similar. Assume that at t ¡ 1 the fundamental
valuation ratio was 15 and the good news at time t drives it to 17. Assume also that the
equilibrium price at t¡1 was 16. Figure 4 shows the valuation ratio dynamics in response
to the good news for both the linear and the heterogeneous agent models.
Figure 4 about here
The Figure shows the average price path over 2000 simulations of the estimated model
in eq. (34). There is a clear di®erence between the linear and the nonlinear model. In the
linear case, the positive shock to the fundamental value leads to an immediate increase of
22the price followed by a mean-reversion thereafter. In contrast, for the nonlinear heteroge-
neous agent model, the pattern that emerges is consistent with the evidence of short-run
continuation of positive returns and long-term reversal. After good news, the agents in-
corporate the news into their expectations and they also expect that part of the previous
period overvaluation will persist this period. One group {the trend followers{ overreacts
and expects a further increase of the price, while the other group {the fundamentalists{
expects the price to diminish over time. The equilibrium price at time t overshoots and al-
most reaches 18. However, in the following two periods trend followers continue to buy the
stock and drive the price (and valuation ratio) even higher. Finally, the reversal starts and
drives the ratio back to its long run fundamental value. Initially, the aggressive investors
interpret the positive news as a con¯rmation that the stock overvaluation was justi¯ed by
forthcoming news. However, the lack of further good news convinces most investors to
switch to the mean reverting expectations and the stock price is driven back towards the
fundamental.
5.2 Will the bubble resume?
We simulate the evolution of the valuation ratios using the proposed heterogeneous agent
model, with the parameter values estimated in the previous section. We will then obtain
the predicted evolution of the ratio conditional on the value realized at the end of 2003. We
generate innovations by reshu²ing the estimated residuals and use them as innovations.
Instead of focusing our attention only on the mean or the median of the distribution we
consider the quantiles corresponding to 10, 30, 50, 70 and 90% probability over the 2000
replications of the estimated model in eq. (34) for the PD ratio and the estimated model
in eq. (36) for the PE ratio. In addition to the quantiles predicted by our nonlinear model
we also plot those predicted by a linear mean reverting model for the valuation ratios.
Figure 5 and 6 show the 1 to 5 periods ahead quantiles of the predictive distribution
for the model when the parameters are set to the values estimated on the PD and PE
ratio, respectively.
Figure 5 about here
Figure 6 about here
The linear model (right plot) predicts that the valuation ratio reverts back toward the
mean at all the quantiles considered. In contrast, the behavioral model predicts that there
is a signi¯cant probability that the ratio may increase again as a result of the activation
23of the trend following regime. The 70% and 90% quantiles clearly show that the PD-ratio
may increase again to levels above 75. Stated di®erently, our heterogeneous agent model
predicts that with probability over 30% the PD-ratio may increase to more than 75. Note
however that the median predicts that the ratio should decrease as implied by the linear
mean reverting model. Another implication of our model is that if the ¯rst (mean revert-
ing) regime dominates the beliefs of investors, it will enforce a much faster adjustment
than predicted by the linear model. This is clear from the bottom quantiles of the distri-
butions. The results for the PE-ratio are similar, although somewhat less extreme. Our
heterogeneous agent model with evolutionary switching predicts that with a probability of
15% the PE-ratio may increase towards values of almost 35. These simulations show that
predictions from a linear, representative agent model versus a nonlinear, heterogeneous
agent model are quite di®erent. In particular, extreme events with large deviations from
the benchmark fundamental valuation are much more likely in a nonlinear world.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a behavioral asset pricing model with endogenous evolutionary switch-
ing of investors between di®erent forecasting strategies according to their relative past
performances and estimate the model on yearly S&P500 data from 1871-2003. Our esti-
mation results show statistically signi¯cant behavioral heterogeneity and substantial time
variation in the average sentiment of investors. Investors believe that fundamentals are
driving the long term dynamics of stock prices, but they interpret the persistence of the
deviation of stock prices from their benchmark fundamentals in a di®erent way. If a recent
increase in stock prices is observed, agents tend to extrapolate that the mispricing will
increase even further and allocate more capital to the trend following belief. However,
in periods of gradual price changes they believe that the deviation is transitory and will
revert back to its historical mean. This type of time variability of agents average sentiment
is also supported by the survey evidence in Shiller (2000).
In particular, our model suggests an evolutionary explanation of the \irrational exu-
berance" of stock prices in the late nineties. Starting in 1996 the behavior of stock prices
was at odds with the evidence that when deviations are large they tend to revert back to
their long run mean. From 1996 until 1999 the PD ratio indicated that the stock market
was overvalued and it was likely to correct back to the fundamentals. The PE ratio gave
the same indication, although less clearly and somewhat later in time. Despite the com-
mon feeling among investors that stocks were overvalued, the market continued to grow
24by approximately 30% a year. The estimation of our model shows that a large majority
of investors had explosive, trend following beliefs about the persistence of the deviations
from the fundamentals. Apparently, investors neglected the role of fundamental news and
continued to buy stocks for purely speculative reasons. The extraordinary performance of
the trend following strategy convinced most investors to adopt this type of beliefs. The
outcome of our model is consistent with the view that fundamentalists with mean reverting
expectations had limited capital to arbitrage the mispricing away and force stock prices
back to the fundamental values. Our behavioral model suggests that in the mid nineties
optimistic, boundedly rational investors, motivated by short run pro¯tability, reinforced
the rise in stock prices triggered by higher expected cash °ows of the internet sector.
An important topic for future research is to investigate the robustness of behavioral
heterogeneity in ¯nancial market data. In particular, we have chosen a very simple funda-
mental process, the static Gordon growth model with constant growth rate of dividends
or earnings and constant discount rate, allowing only for one jump in the estimated risk
premium based on dividends in 1950, as in Fama and French (2002). For deviations of this
simple benchmark our estimation results show signi¯cant behavioral heterogeneity of fun-
damentalists and trend following trading strategies, both for fundamental valuation based
on dividends and earnings. As a ¯rst step, we show in the Appendix that our estimation
results are fairly robust, by considering deviations from a benchmark fundamental with
time variation in the cash °ow growth rate. With more time variation in the benchmark
fundamental, the estimation results are similar and behavioral heterogeneity is signi¯cant.
An important topic for future work is to investigate whether similar results can be found
at higher frequencies, e.g. for quarterly, monthly weekly or daily stock market data.
Let us ¯nally discuss some other recent related work linking nonlinear econometric
models to a speculative model of asset prices3. van Norden and Schaller (1999) study a
time series switching model with two regimes, an explosive bubble regime and a collapsing
bubble regime. The probability of being in the explosive regime depends negatively on
the relative absolute deviation of the bubble from the fundamental. Stated di®erently,
the larger the absolute relative deviation from the fundamental, the larger the probability
that the (positive or negative) bubble collapses. Brooks and Katsaris (2005) extend this
model to three regimes, adding a third dormant bubble regime where the bubble grows at
the required rate of return without explosive expectations. Another novel feature of their
extension is the observation that an abnormal trading volume is a signal of changing market
3We thank a referee for pointing out the related recent papers of Brooks and Katsaris (2005) and of
van Norden and Schaller (1999)
25expectations about the future of a speculative bubble. In their model the probability that
the bubble collapses increases when trading volume becomes abnormally high. This could
be related to the empirical evidence provided by Kandel and Pearson (1995) who ¯nd a
signi¯cant relation between heterogeneity of analysts expectations and abnormal trading
volume.
These speculative models are somewhat di®erent in spirit and do not start o®, at
least not explicitly, from micro foundations with heterogeneous agents and evolutionary
selection of behavioral rules according to past recent performance. But these nonlinear
switching models can be reconciled with our heterogeneous agent model and the framework
of Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), by modifying the evolutionary ¯tness measure and
include absolute relative deviations from the fundamental price and trading volume in the
¯tness measure for strategy selection. A large absolute deviation from the fundamental
would then act as a far from equilibrium stabilizing force, while abnormally high trading
volume would act as a trigger event for bubble collapse. A distinctive feature of our
approach is that investors' behavior is driven by short run pro¯ts. This may be particularly
important for getting bubbles started. After a few positive random shocks to fundamentals,
motivated by short run pro¯ts trend followers may reinforce the price rise and contribute
to the start of a bubble. Another important di®erence concerns the probability of extreme,
long lasting bubbles as in the late nineties. When investors' expectations are mainly based
upon relative deviations from fundamentals a long lasting bubble becomes more and more
likely to burst. In contrast, as long as investment strategies are to a large extent driven
by short run pro¯t opportunities such bubbles may continue for a long time and cause
extreme deviations from fundamentals. Further empirical work on estimating various
heterogeneous agent models and determining the main driving forces of large deviations
from fundamentals is an important topic for future work.
26Appendix A: Bootstrap F-test for Linearity
We evaluate the statistical signi¯cance of the heterogeneous agent model compared to a
linear model using a bootstrap approach. Standard testing procedures cannot be applied
for this model because of the presence of a nuisance parameter. If we assume the null
hypothesis that Á1 = Á2 in Equation (28) then the intensity of choice ¯ in Equation (29)
is not identi¯ed (under the null). On the other hand, if we assume the null that ¯ = 0,
then the di®erence (Á1¡Á2) is not identi¯ed. To overcome this testing problem, we adapt
the bootstrap approach proposed by Hansen (1996) to the case of the nonlinear model
discussed in this paper. The test is carried out as follow:
1. Estimate the (unrestricted) nonlinear model in Equation (28)-(29) and the (re-
stricted) linear model R¤xt = °xt¡1+´t; calculate the F (or Wald) statistic given by
F = T(^ ¾2
´ ¡ ^ ¾2
²)=^ ¾2
² where ^ ¾2
´ denotes the residual variance (not degrees-of-freedom
corrected) in the linear model and ^ ¾2
² in the nonlinear model.
2. Simulate B series from the estimated linear model by resampling the ¯tted residuals
^ ´t
3. For each series calculate the bootstrap F statistic as described in step (1) and denote
it F¤
b (b = 1;:::;B)
4. The bootstrap p-value of the F statistic is given by
P
b I(F¤
b > F)=B, where I(¢) is
the indicator function that is equal to 1 if the condition is satis¯ed.
Appendix B: Time-Varying Fundamental Value
The dynamic Gordon model
The standard approach to value an asset is to assume that it is equal to the present








where Pt is the price of the asset at the end of period t, Yt+1 is the cash °ow paid during
period t + 1 and rt+1 is the discount rate at time t + 1. Et(¢) indicates the expectation
conditional upon information available at time t. Solving Equation (37) forward for T pe-


















27where we indicate P¤
t as the fundamental value. We de¯ne the growth rate of the cash

















The time variation of gt and rt and the nonlinearity in the pricing equation complicate
the derivation of analytically tractable formulas. One approach to simplify the problem
consists of assuming that the cash °ow growth rate and the required rate of return are
constant and equal to g and r, respectively. Under these assumptions, Equation (39)
implies the static Gordon model introduced in Equation (13), leading to,
P¤
t = mYt; (40)
where m = (1 + g)=(r ¡ g). The stock price at time t is given by the cash °ow times
a multiple that depends on the ex-ante required rate of return and the growth rate of
cash °ows. However, assuming the cash °ow growth rate and the expected returns to be
constant over time may be too restrictive. It is possible to allow for time variation by
following the approach of Poterba and Summers (1988). They approximate the pricing
formula given in (39) by a ¯rst-order Taylor expansion around the mean of the required



















jg (gt+j ¡ g)
3
5Yt (41)













(1 + g)(r ¡ g)
®j; (43)

































The pricing formula depends on the expectations of investors about future ex-ante re-
turns and cash °ow growth rate. A typical assumption made in the literature is that the
expectations follow an AR(1) process, that is
Et(rt+j ¡ r) = ½j(rt ¡ r) (45)
28Et(gt+j ¡ g) = Áj(gt ¡ g); (46)
and the approximated pricing formula in Equation (44) becomes
P¤
t = mtDt; (47)







(r ¡ g)(1 + r ¡ ½(1 + g))
(rt ¡ r) +
Á(1 + r)




This version of the fundamental value is known in the literature as the dynamic Gordon
model because it de¯nes asset prices as a time-varying multiplier of the cash °ows. The
multiplier in Equation (48) has a straightforward interpretation: if the required rate of
return and the growth rate of cash °ows are constant and equal to their mean then it
collapses to the static multiplier of Equation (40). However, time variation in the required
rate of return and/or in the cash °ows growth rate changes the level of the multiplier. The
response of fundamental prices to changes in rt and gt is similar to the case of the static
Gordon: if investors require at time t a return higher (lower) than the average r, this will
decrease (increase) the multiplier and consequently prices. On the other hand, if cash
°ows grow at a higher (lower) rate at time t, this will increase (decrease) the multiplier
and will a®ect positively (negatively) stock prices. Equation (48) shows that the multiplier
depends also on the AR coe±cients in the expectations of the required return and the cash
°ow growth rate. High ½ and Á imply that shocks to gt and rt will have a persistent e®ect
on the multiplier and on fundamental prices.
Empirical Evidence
We investigate the deviation of the stock price from the fundamental value de¯ned by the
dynamic Gordon model. In constructing the dynamic fundamental value we allow for time
variation in the cash °ow growth rate gt while we keep constant the discount rate r. For
the PD ratio we consider one jump of the risk premium in 1950, as considered earlier,
while it is constant over the full sample for the PE ratio. The PD and PE ratio resulting
from the dynamic Gordon model Equation (48) are shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7 about here
The estimation results for the deviation of the stock price from the dynamic fundamental
value based on dividends are reported below:
R¤xt = ntf0:761xt¡1g + (1 ¡ nt)f1:14 xt¡1g + b ²t
(0:057) (0:038)
(49)
nt = f1 + exp[¡7:66 (¡0:379xt¡3)(xt¡1 ¡ R¤xt¡2)]g¡1
(5:92)
29R2=0:814; AIC=3:22; AICAR(1)=3:36; ÁAR(1)=0:891; QLB(4)=0:17; Fboot(p-value)=21:95 (0:00)
The results are similar to the static case given in Equation (34). This is due to the
negligible di®erence between the static and the dynamic fundamental value, see the upper
panel of Figure 7. The AR(1) coe±cient for the dividend growth rate in Equation (46) is
estimated at 0.01 before 1950 and 0.50 after 1950. Although the persistence of the growth
rate has signi¯cantly increased after 1950, it is insu±cient to explain the much higher
persistence of the realized PD ratio. This is a point made earlier by Barsky and deLong
(1993) that high persistence (they assume a unit root) in the dividend growth rate process
is required in order to account for the dynamics of stock prices. However, historical data
do not support the hypothesis of such high persistence in the cash °ow process.
For the PE ratio the results for the dynamic Gordon model are qualitatively similar to the
static case in Eq. (36), although the bootstrap F-test does not reject the null hypothesis
of linearity at 5% signi¯cance level (p-value=0.056). The estimation results are
R¤xt = ntf0:785xt¡1g + (1 ¡ nt)f1:103xt¡1g + b ²t
(0:071) (0:14)
(50)
nt = f1 + exp[¡1:59 (¡0:318xt¡3)(xt¡1 ¡ R¤xt¡2)]g¡1
(1:87)
R2=0:726; AIC=2:38; AICAR(1)=2:42; ÁAR(1)=0:948; QLB(4)=0:49; Fboot(p-value)=6:69 (0:056)
Notice that for both the PD and PE ratio, the estimated coe±cients of the trend
following regime are very similar (1:14 versus 1:135 for the PD and 1:103 versus 1:097 for
the PE ratio) for the dynamic Gordon compared to the static Gordon. This result is also
supported by the F-test for linearity that rejects the null hypothesis at 10% for both ratio.
This evidence suggests that our ¯nding of behavioral heterogeneity seems fairly robust
when time variation in the fundamental value is considered.
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34Table 1: Fundamental Value
Values used for the fundamental process: ¼ is the average in°ation rate, y=p is the average
cash °ow yield Yt=Pt¡1, g is the average growth rate of real cash °ows (earnings are smoothed
using a 10-years moving-average), r = y=p+g is the discount rate, i is the average real return
on commercial paper, RP = y=p + g ¡ i is the risk premium, R
¤ = (1 + r)=(1 + g) the gross
rate of return and m = (1+g)=(r ¡g) is the constant price-to cash-°ow ratio in the Gordon
model. We used the CPI index to de°ate the nominal variables. All numbers, except R
¤
and m are expressed as percents, that is, they are multiplied by 100.
¼ y=p g r i RP R¤ m
Div. - 1871/1950 1.07 5.37 2.39 7.74 2.90 4.84 1.054 18.6
Div. - 1951/2003 3.89 3.37 1.08 4.48 2.32 2.16 1.034 29.6
Earn.- 1871/2003 2.24 7.46 1.56 9.13 2.57 6.56 1.074 13.4





























Figure 1: Stock Price and Fundamental Value: (left) Plots of the log of the stock price and of the
fundamental value, and (right) the fundamental and realized Price-To-Cash Flow ratio. The top two graphs
refer to cash °ows measured by dividends while in the bottom graphs earnings are considered. The valuation
approach used is the PVM model with constant cash °ow growth rate and the discount rate given in Table
(I). For earnings, we followed the practice of Campbell and Shiller (2001) to smooth them with a 10 years
moving-average (consequently the series starts in 1880).














Figure 2: PD ratio: (top) Time series of the fraction of the investors' population using
the mean reverting belief, nt, (middle) the scatter plot of nt versus the di®erence in realized
pro¯ts ¢¼t¡1, and (bottom) the series of the average market sentiment coe±cient given by
Át = fntÁ1 + (1 ¡ nt)Á2g=R
¤.














Figure 3: PE ratio: (top) Time series of the fraction of the investors' population using
the mean reverting belief, nt, (middle) the scatter plot of nt versus the di®erence in realized
pro¯ts ¢¼t¡1, and (bottom) the series of the average market sentiment coe±cient given by
Át = fntÁ1 + (1 ¡ nt)Á2g=R
¤.







Figure 4: Response function: Response of the Price-to-Cash Flow Ratio to positive
news about the fundamental value (black squares) in the case of an overvalued asset for
the linear model (dotted line) and the nonlinear heterogeneous agent model (circles).
The parameters used in the simulation are those estimated for the PD ratio. The
plotted response are averages over 2000 simulations.


























Figure 5: Predictive Distribution (PD Ratio): Simulated paths conditional on
the realization of the PD ratio at the end of 2003. Each line represents a quantile of
the predictive distribution for the nonlinear heterogeneous agent model (left) and the
linear representative agent model (right).


























Figure 6: Predictive Distribution (PE Ratio): Simulated paths conditional on
the realization of the PE ratio at the end of 2003. Each line represents a quantile of
the predictive distribution for the nonlinear heterogeneous agent model (left) and the
linear representative agent model (right).
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Figure 7: The Price-to-Cash Flow Ratio and the fundamental value implied by the
static and dynamic Gordon model. For the PD ratio we consider a break in the risk
premium in 1950 and also a change in persistence of the cash °ow growth process. For
the PE ratio we compare the static case - with constant discount rate and earnings
growth rate - with the dynamic one - earnings growth rate is allowed to vary over time.
39